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In the case of Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City Bank,'
Ed Stinn had an employee who embezzled $284,000 over the
course of several years from Stinn's checking account at National
City Bank. 2  The embezzler, Julie Hajjar, maintained the
dealership's cash box, wrote business checks, and with little or no
supervision reconciled Stinn's account at National each month.3
These responsibilities, combined with Stinn's lax accounting
procedures, enabled Hajjar to remove money from Stinn's cash box
and replace the funds with checks drawn on Stinn's account at
National.4 In this way the daily receipts of customer payments
equaled the combined total of the cash and checks in the cash
box.5 These forged checks were routinely deposited in the accounts
on which they were drawn, resulting in a "wash" transaction. 6
Because Hajjar reconciled the bank statement, her embezzlement
scheme went undetected for several years.
In Stinn's suit against National for improper payment of forged
instruments, each party alleged that the other's negligence caused
the loss.7 To determine who between the innocent parties was to
bear this loss, the trial court instructed the jury according to Ohio's
comparative negligence statute.' The jury determined that Stinn's
negligence resulted in eighty-five percent of the loss, and that
1. 28 Ohio St. 3d 221,503 N.E.2d 524 (1986), rev'd in part, 31 Ohio SL 3d 150,509 N.E.
2d 945 (1987).
2. Id. at 221-22, 503 N.E.2d at 526.
3. Id. at 221, 503 N.E.2d at 526.
4. Id. at 222, 503 N.E.2d at 526. Stinn's business checks required two drawers' signatures,
thus Hajiar used her own valid drawer's signature with a forged second drawer's signature, or the
signature of another drawer who was deceived as to the purpose of the check. Id. Additionally, Hajiar
could forge the endorsement on a check made payable to an employee or fictitious person. Id.
Finally, rather than forging the endorsement, Hajiar could use Stinn's rubber-stamp deposit
endorsement. Id.
5. Id. at 221, 503 N.E.2d at 526.
6. Id. A wash transaction is one in which the funds are first debited and then credited to the
same account in an in-and-out process. Id. at 224, 804 N.E.2d at 528.
7. Id. at 222, 503 N.E.2d at 527.
8. Id. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson Supp. 1989) (comparative negligence
statute).
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National's negligence resulted in the other fifteen percent.9
Because Stinn's negligence was greater than National's, and
because the Ohio comparative negligence statute denies recovery
to a plaintiff who was more at fault than the defendant, the trial
court entered judgement in favor of National. 10
Stinn's argument that the trial court erred in applying the law
of comparative negligence was accepted on appeal by the Ohio
Supreme Court.11 The Ohio Supreme Court held that under Ohio's
version of the Uniform Commercial Code, National's failure to
exercise ordinary care precluded National from asserting Stinn's
negligence as a shield, making National fully liable for Stinn's
loss. 12 Although the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the loss from
forged instruments should be shifted to the party bearing
responsibility for the loss, the court permitted a party eighty-five
percent at fault to recover regardless of that party's culpability.
13
The Uniform Commercial Code (Code) allocates the risk of loss
for forged checks in Articles 3 and 4. This Comment analyzes the
allocation of loss under the current version of the Code, and the
proposed revisions thereto. 4 Parts II and Ill of this Comment will
briefly examine the pertinent sections of the current Code and the
proposed revisions to the Code. 5 The major issues arising from
these sections are discussed in Part IV by first examining the
handling of a hypothetical fact pattern under the present Code, and
then analyzing the treatment of those facts under the proposed
revisions."6 Finally, Part V of this Comment will analyze whether
the proposed revisions to the Code deal adequately with the
9. Stinn, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 222, 503 N.E.2d at 527.
10. Id. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson Supp. 1989) (comparative negligence
statute).
11. Stinn, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 222, 503 N.E.2d at 527.
12. Id. at 231-32, 503 N.E.2d at 534.
13. Id. at 226, 503 N.E.2d at 530. Stinn was unable to recover on any theory other than
consequential damages, because the bank's liability for the forged checks was extinguished when the
improperly withdrawn funds were redeposited. Id. at 236-37, 503 N.E.2d at 537-38. Cf. infra note
91 and accompanying text (a bank is not liable to a drawer of a check with a forged endorsement
when the funds reach the intended payee).
14. See infra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 83-239 and accompanying text.
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problems arising in this area of the law and those presented in
cases such as Ed Stinn Chevrolet.7
I. BACKGROUND
In Ed Stinn Chevrolet, the Ohio Supreme Court applied the
Uniform Commercial Code properly in reaching its conclusion, yet
the result seems somewhat inequitable.18 In its present form the
Code attempts to allocate the loss from forged checks to the person
who is in the best position to avoid the loss. 9 The risk of loss as
between a depositary bank" and a drawee bank21 is allocated
differently in the context of a forged drawer's 22 signature and a
forged endorsement.' However, in either situation the drawee
17. See infra notes 240-250 and accompanying text.
18. The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately held that Stinn would be permitted to recover if Stinn
could assert that payment of checks containing a forged drawer's signature was made in bad faith,
or if such damages were within the contemplation of the contracting parties. Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc.
v. National City Bank, 28 Ohio St. 3d 221, 237, 503 N.E.2d 524, 538. See CLARK, THE LAW OF
BANK Dmosrrs, CoLLEc Ns AND CRnErr CARDs, 8-37 (3d ed. 1990) (hereinafter CLARK)
(although Stinn suffered no direct loss from the "wash" transactions, consequential damages were
recoverable if the bank acted in bad faith).'
19. Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City Bank, 28 Ohio St. 3d 221,226,503 N.E. 2d 524,
530 (1986). See Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553 F.2d 398,405 (5th Cir.
1977) (one of the policies of the Code is to allocate the loss to either the drawee bank or prior parties
in the collection chain according to their ability to detect different forgeries). Cf. U.C.C. § 3-405
comment 4 (1987) (an employer is in a better position to prevent forgeries by the selection and
supervision of his employees, and thus bears the risk of loss for their forged endorsements).
20. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 396 (5th ed. 1979) (the depositary is the party or bank
which receives a deposit).
21. See id. at 444 (the drawee is the bank on which the check is drawn, and is requested to
pay the amount of money mentioned therein).
22. See idt (the drawer is the person who signs the check or draft).
23. J. WHnm & R. SummE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE, 689 (3d ed. 1988). Circuit Judge
Goldberg stated the framework of the Code as:
Perpetuating a distinction introduced into the legal annals by Lord Mansfield in the eighteenth
century, the Code accords separate treatment to forged drawer signatures (hereinafter "forged
checks") and forged endorsements. In general, the drawee bank is strictly liable to its customer
drawer for payment of either a forged check or a check containing a forged endorsement. In the
case of a forged endorsement, the drawee generally may pass liability back through the
collection chain to the party who took from the forger and, of course, to the forger himself if
available.
Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1977).
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bank will generally have to bear the initial loss, and must recredit
the drawer's account.24
In the case of a forged drawer's signature, where there is no
negligence on the part of any party, the drawee bank is considered
to be in the best position to detect the forged signature and
generally must bear the ultimate loss.' This is because of the
drawee bank's familiarity with the drawer's signature. The
drawee's payment on a forged drawer's signature is final in favor
of a holder in due course,26 or one who in good faith27  has
changed position in reliance on the payment.28 Prior parties in the
collection chain meeting these requirements are immunized from
liability for negligence in dealing with the forged check.29
Compare this treatment with the allocation of loss for a forged
endorsement under the Code. Generally, the drawee bank, after
bearing the initial loss, will assert the statutory warranties of
presentment 0 against prior parties in the collection chain.3 With
24. Wirm & SuiMES, supra note 23, at 689. See infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text
(discussing recredit of the drawers account by the drawee bank).
25. Perini, 553 F.2d at 404. See H. BAIuY, BRADY ON BANKc CHECKS, 26-31 (6th ed. 1987)
(drawee bank generally not entitled to recover from collecting bank for forged drawer's signature).
26. See U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (1987) (definition of holder in due course). A holder in duo course
is a person who in good faith takes an instrument for value without notice that it is overdue,
dishonored, or that another person has a defense against or a claim to it. Id. Hereinafter all references
to the U.C.C. will be to the 1987 edition unless otherwise indicated.
27. See id. § 1-201(19) (defining good faith as honesty in fact). Compare with Proposed
U.C.C. § 3-103 (proposed final draft May 10, 1990) (defining good faith as honesty in fact, and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing) (hereinafter all citations to the
proposed revisions to the code will be prefixed by an -R- i.e. U.C.C. § R3-103).
28. U.C.C. § 3-418.
29. Perini, 553 F.2d at 404. See U.C.C. § 3-418 (payment of an instrument is final in favor
of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on
payment). Section 3-418 is a codification of the rule in Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (K.B. 1762),
which held that a drawee who accepts or pays an instrument with a forged drawer's signature is
bound on acceptance and cannot recover any payment. Id. § 3-418 comment 1.
30. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-207(1)(a) (warranties of presentment). The warranties of
presentment are substantially similar. Section 4-207 provides in part:
(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an item and each
prior customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or other payor who in good faith
pays or accepts the item that
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on
behalf of one who has a good title.
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a forged endorsement, the party that accepts the check from the
forger is considered to be in the best position to prevent the loss
since that party is able to detect improprieties in the
endorsement.32 Ultimately, the loss will be borne by the first
solvent party who received the check after the forger, or ideally the
loss will be born by the forger himself.33 Thus, in the absence of
negligence on the part of the drawer, the drawer bears no risk of
loss for either forged endorsements or forged signatures.34
However, if the drawer negligently facilitates the making of an
unauthorized signature,35  or fails to report an unauthorized
signature within a reasonable time,36 the Code shifts the loss to
the drawer.37
Where both the drawer and a transferee are negligent, the
question arises as to how the risk of loss should be allocated
between the negligent parties. One possibility is an allocation of
loss based on culpability, where each party's liability is in
Id. § 4-207 (1)(a).
31. Perini, 553 F.2d at 404.
32. CLARK, supra note 18, at 6-35. See also Perini, 553 F.2d at 405 (one of the policies upon
which the Code rests is an "outmoded notion" that a drawee bank is in the best position to detect
a forged endorsement); Girard v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1230-31 (D. NJ.
1979) (identifying the scheme of the Code as placing liability on the person who takes from the
forger because they are in the best position to detect and avoid the fraud).
33. Perini, 553 F.2d at 404. See Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City Bank, 28 Ohio St.
3d 221,226, 503 N.E. 2d 524, 530 (1986) (stating that the loss should be borne by the thief, or the
party responsible for the loss). In Stinn the plaintiff was able to recover $108,000 from the forger.
Id. at 222, 503 N.E.2d at 526.
34. See U.C.C. §§ 3-406 (drawer bears risk of loss if only drawer is negligent), 4-406 (drawer
bears risk of loss if drawer breaches duty to promptly inspect statement of account).
35. See infra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (discussing the preclusion defense of
U.C.C. § 3-406).
36. See infra notes 115-120 and accompanying text (discussing the customer's duties to
inspect his statement of account under U.C.C. section 4-406). This liability is only for future forgeries
by the same forger. U.C.C. § 4-406(2).
37. See U.C.C. §§ 3-405, 3-406, 4-406. See also CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPosrrs,
COLLEC11ONS AND CREDr CARDS 6-4 (Rev. ed. 1981) (hereinafter CLARKE REV.) (drawer will be
able to recover unless the drawer negligently facilitates the forgery, or fails to discover the forgery
within a reasonable time). Under common law, if the drawer negligently facilitated a material
alteration or forgery of an instrument then the drawer was liable to a drawee who paid the instrument
in good faith. Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253 (K.B. 1827). This position is expressly adopted by the
Code. U.C.C. § 3-406 comment 1.
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proportion to their fault.38 Alternatively, the risk may be allocated
to the person who had the last chance to avoid the injury. The
present Code adopts the latter position, and distributes the loss
through the application of the law of contributory negligence.
39
Although most states have adopted a form of comparative
negligence in areas other than commercial transactions, courts and
commentators have been hesitant to urge the judicial adoption of
a comparative negligence standard for negotiable instruments
without legislative approval."° Because the law of contributory
negligence contemplates all or nothing liability, an entire court
judgment may turn on minor factual distinctions, or on a jury's
determination of credibility. Moreover, as the Stinn case shows, a
party eighty-five percent at fault may potentially still recover for
the full amount of its loss,4 1 arguably an inequitable result. This
inequity has helped create a lack of uniformity between
jurisdictions as they struggle for just solutions.
38. See, e.g. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,532 P.2d 1226,119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(California's adoption of pure comparative negligence allocating the damages according to a
percentage of total fault).
39. WHm & SuMsERs, supra note 23, at 712. See U.C.C. §§ 3406,4406,3-405 (adopting
a system of contributory negligence).
40. See WHrE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, at 714 (urging that comparative negligence not
be judicially adopted). See also Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1242
(D. NJ. 1979) (suggesting that comparative negligence may be a better solution, but leaving that step
for the legislature or the New Jersey Supreme Court); Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City Bank,
28 Ohio St. App. 3d 221, 222-23, 503 N.E.2d 524, 527 (1986) (approval of appellate court's
reasoning that comparative negligence statute does not apply to negligence in negotiable instruments,
because the action was governed by the U.C.C. and sounded in contract, not in tort). But see Sun 'N
Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671,699-700,582 P.2d 920,939-40, 148 Cal. Rptr.
329, 348-49 (1978) (suggesting that the principles of contributory negligence may be used for section
4-406 defenses); CLARK REv. ED, supra note 37, at 6-16 (comparative negligence is a more rational
approach); Cf. Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Construction Co., 231 Or. 106, 126, 370 P.2d 726,
735-36 (1962) (arising before the adoption of the Code, holding that where a payee's "commercial
unreasonableness" outweighed the negligence of the payor, the payor will be permitted to recover);
Coffin v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co, 374 Pa. 378, 390-91, 97 A.2d 857, 863 (1953) (a rejection
or comparative negligence under negotiable instruments law because the bank's liability is for breach
of contract). For a statute adopting a comparative negligence approach, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § § 4-3-
406; 4-4-406 (1987).
41. Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City Bank, 28 Ohio St. 3d 221,236-38,503 N.E.2d
524, 537-38 (1986). See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of
comparative negligence, so party 85% at fault could recover).
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II. THE U.C.C. PROVISIONS
The Code allocates the risk of loss for forgery and forged
endorsements with three principle sections.42 Section 3-406 deals
with situations in which the drawer's negligence substantially
contributes to the making of the unauthorized signature 43 or
material alteration.' Under section 4-406 a customer has a duty
to discover and report unauthorized signatures to the bank.45
Finally, section 3-405 makes unauthorized endorsements effective
under specific circumstances.46
A. U.C.C. Section 3-406
Section 3-406 provides that if a drawer's negligence
"substantially contributes" to the material alteration of an
instrument, or the making of an unauthorized signature, the drawer
is precluded from asserting the alteration against a drawee or other
payor.47 However, if in paying the instrument, the drawee fails to
act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards of the drawee's business, then the Code places the risk
of loss on the drawee.4 1 Section 3-406 incorporates principles of
contributory negligence to place the loss on the party who had the
last chance to avoid the forgery. Thus, if the bank is negligent, the
drawer is entitled to recredit of his account regardless of the
drawer's negligence.
42. See U.C.C. §§ 3-406 (allocation of loss when drawer's negligence contributes to forgery),
4-406 (drawer's duty to inspect statements of account), 3-405 (allocation of loss when forger is
drawer's employee).
43. See id. § 1-201(43) (definition of unauthorized signature or endorsement). Case law
suggests that "unauthorized signatures" includes forged endorsements. See, e.g., Girard Bank v.
Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 (D. NJ. 1979) (unauthorized signatures includes
both forged drawer's signature, and forged endorsements); Allied Concord Fin. Corp. v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assn., 275 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5,80 Cal. Rptr. 622,626 (1969) (applying
U.C.C. § 4-406 to a forged endorsement). See also U.C.C. § 3-406 comment 7 (specifically referring
to a forged endorsement situation).
44. U.C.C. § 3-406. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. § 3406).
45. U.C.C. § 4-406. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. § 4-406).
46. U.C.C. § 3-405. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. § 3405).
47. U.C.C. § 3-406.
48. Id.
1271
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
B. U.C.C. Section 4-406
Under section 4-406, if a customer fails to use reasonable
diligence and promptness in examining the customer's canceled
checks, the customer is precluded from asserting an unauthorized
signature or alteration against the drawee bank unless the bank was
negligent in paying the items.49 The customer is precluded from
recovery to the extent the customer's failure causes a loss, or if the
subsequent unauthorized signature is by the same wrongdoer.50
More importantly, section 4-406 also creates a statute of
limitations. If the customer fails to discover and report an
unauthorized signature within one year, or fails to discover and
report an unauthorized endorsement within three years, the
customer is absolutely barred from asserting that defect against the
bank.5 When the bank is negligent, the bank will be the last party
capable of avoiding the injury, and the principles of contributory
negligence dictate that the bank must bear the loss regardless of the
customer's negligence. Thus, unless the drawer's action for recredit
is time-barred, negligence on the part of the bank permits the
drawer's recovery, regardless of the drawer's negligence in failing
to examine his statement of account.
C. U.C.C. Section 3-405
Section 3-405 is another principle section of the Code
governing the allocation of the risk of loss. For example, under
section 3-405(1)(b), an endorsement by a person in the name of the
payee is effective if the person signing as, or on behalf of the
drawer intends for the payee to have no interest in the
instrument.52 Thus, regardless of subsequent negligence, the
drawer will bear the entire loss for the fraudulent endorsement.53
49. Id. § 4-406(2), (3).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 4-406(4).
52. Id. § 3-405(1)(b).
53. Id. §§ 3-405(1)(b), 3-405 comment 3.
1272
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These sections have been called a "carefully designed
machine" which were intended by the drafters to make the
drawer's negligence operate as an estoppel, with the bank's
contributory negligence reopening a claim on the unauthorized
signature.54
III. PROPOSED REVISIONS
Present articles 3 and 4 were drafted almost exclusively by
banker's attorneys, and have been termed "a deliberate sell-out...
to the bank lobby . . . for their support of the rest of the
'Code.' " 55 With the development of the consumer movement, the
orientation towards the bank lobby has become increasingly
controversial.56 Although the revisions do not create any new
consumer rights, there is some movement towards consumer
protection in specific provisionsY Significant among these
provisions are those adopting a system of comparative
negligence.58
Arguably, the seeming inequities inherent in a system of
contributory negligence helped motivate the Code's switch to a
comparative negligence standard. Where only one party is
negligent, the revisions to articles 3 and 4 will generally allocate
the risk of loss to the same person who would bear the loss under
the present Code.59 However, where both parties have failed to
exercise ordinary care,6° the proposed revisions to the Code
allocate the risk of loss through the doctrine of pure comparative
negligence.6' Under this form of comparative negligence, the loss
54. WHrE & SUmMES, supra note 23, at 689-90.
55. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not be Adopted, 61 YALE
LJ. 334, 362 (1952).
56. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, 43
Bus. LAW. 621, 627 (1988).
57. Id. at 627-28.
58. See U.C.C. §§ R3-404, P.3-405, 13-406, R4-406 (provisions adopting comparative
negligence).
59. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ R3-406 (negligent drawer is precluded from recovery), R4-406 (a
failure of drawer to inspect statement of account precludes recovery).
60. See U.C.C. § R3-103(a)(7) (definition of ordinary care).
61. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ R3-406, R4-406(5), R3-404(b), P.3-405(b).
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is allocated between the parties to the extent their negligence
contributed to the loss.
62
A. U.C.C. Section R3-406
Although section R3-406 is expressly limited to forged
signatures,63 it is clear the term "forged signatures" is intended
to be broad enough to include forged endorsements.64 Under the
proposed revisions to section 3-406, as under the current version of
the Code, a drawer who substantially contributes to the making of
a forged signature is precluded from asserting that defect against
a person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for
value.6' However, unlike the current version of the Code, section
R3-406 states that if the person asserting this preclusion against the
drawer was negligent, then the loss is allocated between the parties
to the extent their negligence contributed to the loss.66 Proposed
section R3-406 now allocates the loss to each party to the extent
their negligence caused the forged signature.
B. U. C. C. Section R4-406
The customer's existing duty to discover and report the
customer's unauthorized signature under section 4-406 is continued
in the proposed revisions to section 4-406.67 The customer has a
duty to exercise reasonable promptness in examining a statement
of account68 provided by the bank, to determine whether any
62. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811,532 P.2d 1226,1232,119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
864 (1975) (pure comparative negligence allocating the damages according to a percentage of total
fault).
63. U.C.C. § R3-406(a).
64. See id. §§ R3-406 comment 2, case 2 (explicitly applying section R3-406(a) to a forged
endorsement situation), R3-406 comment 4 (explicitly applying section R3-406(b) to a forged
endorsement situation). See also iUL § R3-406 comment 2 (stating that the law of agency should
control to determine whether the signature binds the principal, or is an unauthorized signature).
65. U.C.C. § R3'406.
66. Id. § R3-406(b).
67. Id. § R4-406
68. See id. § R4-406(1) (requirements for a statement of account).
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payment or signature was unauthorized. 9 A customer who fails
to comply with this duty of inspection is precluded from asserting
specified improprieties against the bank.7 However, under section
R4-406, if the bank failed to exercise ordinary care, and that failure
substantially contributed to the loss, then the loss is to be allocated
between the parties according to the extent their negligence
contributed to the loss.7 1
C. U.C.C. Section R3-405
Proposed section R3-405 is limited to forged endorsements72
where the employer has entrusted an employee73  with
responsibility74 for instruments as a part of the employee's
duties.75 When an employer has given such responsibilities to the
employee, proposed section R3-405 allocates the risk of loss to the
employer for the employee's fraudulent endorsement of an
instrument.7 6 However, if the bank has also been negligent, the
employer may shift the loss to the bank to the extent the bank
69. Id. § R4-406(3).
70. Id. § R4-406. If the customer neglects the section R4-406(3) duties, the customer is
precluded from asserting a claim that the signature was unauthorized if the bank suffered a loss
caused by the customer's failure. Id. § R4-406(4)(a). The customer is also precluded from asserting
subsequent forgeries by the same person if the payment was made before the bank received
notification of the unauthorized signature. Id. § R4-406(4)(b).
71. Id. § R4-406(5). The R4-406(4) preclusion does not apply if the customer proves the bank
did not pay the item in good faith. Id § R4-406(5).
72. See id. § R3-405(a)(2) (definition of forged endorsement for section R3-405). If the
instrument is payable to the employer, the forged endorsement is the purported signature of the
employer. Id. § R3-405(a)(2)i). If the employer is the drawer of the instrument, the forged
endorsement is the purported signature of the payee. Id. § R3-405(a)(2)(ii).
73. Id. § R3-405(a)(1) (definition of employee). This definition includes an independent
contractor retained by the employer. Id.
74. See id. § R3-405(a)(3) (definition of responsibility with respect to instruments). An
employee has responsibility with respect to instruments if the employee can: (1) Sign or indorse
instruments on behalf of the employer, (2) processes instruments for deposit to an account for
bookkeeping purposes; or (3) prepare or process instruments to be issued in the employer's name.
Id.
75. Id. § R3-405.
76. Id. § R3-405 comment 1.
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contributed to the loss.' To allocate the loss to either party, the
party's failure must have substantially contributed to the loss.78
As with the sections discussed above, the adoption of comparative
negligence will allocate the loss between the parties according to
their fault.
D. U. C.C. Section R3-404(b)
Under section R3-404(b), if the drawer does not intend the
payee to have an interest in the instrument, then any endorsement
in the name of the payee7' is effective as to a person who in good
faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.8" If, however, the
person who pays the instrument or takes the instrument for value
fails to exercise ordinary care, then the person bearing the loss may
recover from the person failing to exercise ordinary care to the
extent the failure substantially contributed to the loss. 1
In addition to these four sections, which represent the adoption
of comparative negligence in the proposed revisions to articles 3
and 4, the proposed revisions attempt to limit the jurisdictional
variations created by articles 3 and 4. Although a full analysis of
the changes is beyond the scope of this Comment, the significant
changes dealing with risk allocation are discussed in the following
section. 2 Because much of the law of negotiable instruments is
factually dependant, the present jurisdictional variations and the
77. Id. § R3-405(b). See U.C.C. §§ R3-405 comment I (if bank was negligent, employer may
shift to the bank that part of the loss to which the bank's failure contributed), R3-405 comment 4 (if
trier of fact finds that bank failed to exercise ordinary care, and such failure substantially contributed
to the loss, then the trier of fact could find a bank liable to the employer to the extent bank's failure
contributed to the loss).
78. Id. § R3-405(b).
79. See id. § R3-404(c) (an endorsement is in the name of the payee if it is substantially
similar to the name of the payee).
80. Id. § R3-404(b). Section R3-404(b) also applies where the drawer makes the instrument
payable to a fictitious person. Id. Any person in possession of the instrument is the holder of the
instrument. Id. § R3-404(b)(1). See id. § R3-404 comment 2 (R3-404 applies to forged check cases).
81. Id. § R3-404(d).
82. See infra notes 148-176 and accompanying text (discussing the allocation of the risk of
loss).
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solutions proposed by the revised Code will be discussed through
the use of a hypothetical.
IV. A HYPOTHETICAL
A. Statement of Hypothetical
Ed Stinn (Stinn), has a bookkeeper, Julie Haijar (Haijar), who
prepares checks for the signature of Stinn. Hajiar prepares a check
payable to Creditor, and gets Stinn to signthe check. Thief, a vice
president at Stinn, finds the signed check in Stinn's office, forges
Creditor's endorsement on the check, and cashes the check at Local
Bank (LB). Before hiring Thief, Stinn did not check Thief's
references, ignoring company policy at the time. The check passes
through normal banking channels, and is eventually charged to
Stinn's account at Big Bank (BB). Thief disappears without giving
the money to Creditor. 3
B. Does Stinn Have the Ability to State a Prima Facie Case to
Compel BB to Recredit Stinn's Account?
1. Resolution Under the Current Code
BB, as a drawee bank, may debit only those items from Stinn's
account which are properly payable. 4 An unauthorized signature
83. Several cases arising before the adoption of the Code held that by pursuing a claim against
the forger the drawer ratifies the forger's conduct. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v.
Fourth Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 28 F.2d 933, 935 (5th Cir. 1928) (drawer's suit against forger ratified
forger's action). Under the Code, however, courts have generally held that the drawer does not ratify
the forgery by pursuing the forger. See, e.g., Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 656
P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1982) (declining to require an election of remedies); Twellman v. Lindell Trust
Co., 534 S.W. 2d 83, 93-94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (declining to require an election of remedies). See
also U.C.C. § 3-404(2) (unauthorized signature may be ratified); § 3-404 comment 3 (ratification is
to be determined by the rules of agency). See generally BAMEY, supra note 25 at 26-14, 26-16-17
(arguing that a good faith claim against the forger should not ratify a forged endorsement, and noting
that an explicit reservation of rights by giving notice to the bank under U.C.C. section 1-207 can
protect a depositor).
84. U.C.C. § 4-401(1).
1277
Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 22
is "wholly inoperative." 85 An item containing a forged or
unauthorized signature is not properly payable.86 Therefore, a
forged signature generally imposes no liability on the person whose
name was forged.'7
The law implies an agreement between the bank and its
customer to pay the depositor's checks only in conformity with the
depositor's order.8" Payment of a forged check does not comply
with the depositor's order, and therefore payment of a forged check
is a breach of contract, which remains actionable under the
Code.89 However, there are several ways that Stinn may be
precluded from denying the validity of the unauthorized
signature.9' If the payee of Stinn's check, Creditor, receives the
proceeds from the check, then Stinn has no cause of action against
BB even though Creditor's endorsement was forged.9" Another
85. Id § 3404(1). See Bridgeport Firemen's Sick & Death Benefit Ass'n v. Deseret Fed. Sav.
& Loan Assn, 735 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir. 1984) (an unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative
as that of the person whose name is signed unless the person ratifies it or is precluded from denying
it).
86. See Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces, 676 F.2d 1344, 1345
(10th Cir. 1982) (item with forged endorsement is not properly payable because the unauthorized
endorsement is wholly inoperative); Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553 F.2d
398, 403 (5th Cir. 1977) (a check containing a forged endorsement is not properly payable).
87. BAILEY, supra note 25, at 25-4.
88. See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 157, 304 A.2d 838, 842-43 (1973)
(U.C.C. codifies the underlying contract implied between the bank and its customer that the bank will
pay only those items which are properly payable); BAILEY, supra note 25, at 25-6 (an implied
agreement exists that a drawee bank will pay out the funds of the drawer only on order from the
depositor).
99. Guis Ins. Society v. Girard Bank, 522 F. Supp. 414, 419 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See
Coffin v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co, 374 Pa. 378, 390-91, 97 A.2d 857, 863 (1953) (bank's
liability arises from a breach of the underlying contract). See also Stone & Webster Eng'g Co. v.
First NatI Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E. 2d 358, 360 (1962) (a depositor has a
contractual relation of debtor and creditor with depositor's bank).
90. See U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (an unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative unless the drawer
ratifies the signature, or is precluded from denying the signature). There currently exists a
jurisdictional split on whether the standards for preclusion under sections 3-404(1) and 3-406 are the
same. U.C.C. § R3-403 comment I (noting that split of judicial opinion presently exists).
91. See Gotham-Vladimir Advertising, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 27 A.D.2d 190,277 N.Y.S.2d
719, 722 (1967) (drawer is precluded from recovering from drawee bank where the proceeds of the
check reach the intended recipient); Coplin v. Maryland Trust Co., 222 Md. 119, 123, 159 A.2d 356,
358 (1960) (where payee receives proceeds drawer has suffered no loss from drawee bank's breach
of duty). Cf. First City Nat'l Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 782 F.2d 1344, 1348 (5th Cir. 1986)
(constructive receipt is narrow equitable defense where drawer suffers no injury, thus although funds
reached payee beneficially, they were not applied for drawer's intended purpose, and doctrine is
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way in which Stinn will be precluded from recovery is if the
endorsement was authorized through agency principles such as
ratification, estoppel, or apparent authority.'
Under the facts of the hypothetical, Thief had no authority to
sign the check, and Creditor did not receive the proceeds of the
check. Thus, because estoppel and apparent authority are not
implicated by the facts, Stinn has a right to have his account
recredited for the amount of the check to Creditor absent a
ratification of the unauthorized signature.
2. Resolution under the Proposed Code
The proposed revisions to the Code continue the position that
an unauthorized signature is wholly ineffective.93 Proposed section
4-401(a) states that the bank can only pay those items which are
properly payable.94 Comment 1 to section R4-401 explicitly states
that instruments containing forged signatures or endorsements are
not properly payable.9" Thus, under the proposed revisions to the
Code, Stirn will continue to have a right to have its account at BB
recredited.
C. BB's Defenses to Stinn's Action
The current Code provides two principal defenses which are
available to BB under the facts of the hypothetical." One of these
defenses, section 3-406, provides that Stirn will be precluded from
asserting the unauthorized signature if Stinn's negligent conduct
"substantially contributes"'97 to the making of the unauthorized
inapplicable).
92. CLARKE, supra note 18, at 6-36.
93. U.C.C. § R3-403(a). While the unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the
person whose name is signed, it does transfer all rights the forger may have in the instrument. Id. §
R3-403 comment 2.
94. Id. § R4-401.
95. Id. §R4-401 comment I.
96. See id. §§ 3-406, 4-406. A third defense arising under section 3-405 is discussed infra
notes 148-176 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text (meaning of "substantially contributes").
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signature.9" The other defense is provided in section 4-406, under
which Stinn will be precluded if Stinn failed to exercise ordinary
care in discovering or reporting the unauthorized signature.' The
facts of the hypothetical will be analyzed under each of these
defenses in the following sections.
1. Current U.C. C. Section 3-406
Under the hypothetical, the issue arises whether Stinn's failure
to examine Thief's references constitutes negligence substantially
contributing to the unauthorized signature."° If the answer to this
issue is yes, then section 3-406 will preclude Stinn from recovery
on -the instrument. Thus the crucial inquiry under section 3-406 is
what constitutes a substantial contribution to an unauthorized
signature.
Although it is uniformly held that a causal connection must
exist between the drawer's negligent act and the loss,'0'
jurisdictions disagree as to the standard of causation required by
section 3-406."0 A number of courts have held that the phrase
"substantially contributes" creates a negligence test that is no
broader than the "substantial factor" test adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.' °3 These jurisdictions suggest that
98. U.C.C. § 3-406.
99. Id. § 4-406.
100. WHrr & SuMMERs, supra note 23, at 693-94. See Commercial Credit Equipment Corp.
v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, 636 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981) (failure to examine
references of employee who was placed in a position of trust handling large sums of money
constitutes negligence).
101. Annotation, Commercial Paper: WhatAmounts to "Negligence Contributing to Alteration
or Unauthorized Signature" Under UCC § 3-406, 67 A.LR. 3D 144, 151 (1975).
102. Compare infra notes 101-104 (courts implementing a direct and proximate cause standard)
with infra notes 105-109 (courts holding that the term "substantially contributes" implements a
shortened chain of causation).
103. See, e.g., Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192,196-97 (8th
Cir. 1974) ("substantially contributes" creates a negligence test no broader than "direct and
proximate cause," because the chain of causation is not shortened, the drawee merely needs to show
that the drawer's negligence was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the forgery). Cf. Dominion
Constr., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 154, 163, 315 A.2d 69, 73-74 (1974) ("substantial
contribution" test replaced the proximate cause test of pre-Code law with the substantial factor test
of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 431). See also Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co,
231 Or. 106, 119-20, 370 P.2d 726, 732-33 (1962) ("substantially contributes" is equivalent to the
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section 3-406 was intended to continue the narrow doctrine of pre-
Code estoppel, precluding the drawer only where the drawer's
negligence contributes to the forgery, not merely to the issuance of
the checks.1 4 Within these jurisdictions the drawer will be
precluded from asserting a claim against the drawee less often.
Because Stinn's failure to examine Hajjar's references contributed
to the issuance of the check, not to the forgery itself, it is unlikely
that Stinn's negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about
Hajiar's forgery.
Other courts adopt the view that the Code's requirement that
the negligence must substantially contribute to the loss shortens the
chain of causation that the drawee must establish in order to
preclude the drawer's cause of action. 05 These courts hold that
if the intent of the Code was to continue the strict estoppel doctrine
of prior law, the term "precluded" could have been used without
the additional requirement of "substantially contributes." 1 " The
negligence need not be a proximate cause of the loss, but need only
be a cause in fact by contributing substantially to the loss before
the drawer will be precluded. 7 By eliminating the requirement
of proximate cause, these jurisdictions shorten the chain of
causation, and increase the drawer's duty to the drawee."0 8
Because the chain of causation is shortened, it is more likely that
Stinn's claim will be precluded. However, it is doubtful that a mere
"substantial factor" test of negligence); Commonwealth v. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 469 Pa. 188,
193-95,364 A.2d 1331,1334-35 (1976) (section 3-406 does not require a showing of more than mere
negligence to bar the drawer and rejecting a shortened chain of causation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRis § 431 (1965) (actor's negligent conduct is legal cause of harm if it is a substantial factor
in bring about the harm). See generally Annotation, supra note 101, at 159-60 (whether substantially
contributes is equivalent to a substantial factor test, or shortens the chain of causation).
104. Bagby, 491 F.2d at 197.
105. Thompson Maple Products, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 211 Pa. Super. 42,47,234 A.2d
32,34 (1967), rejected by Commonwealth v. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 469 Pa. 188,364 A.2d 1331
(1976). See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co, 65 Misc. 2d 619, 621,
318 N.Y.S.2d 957,959 (1970), aftd39 App. Div. 2d 1019,333 N.Y.S2d 726 (1972) (U.C.C. section
3-406 adopts a shortened chain of causation and increases the drawer's duty of care to the drawee).
106. Thompson, 211 Pa. Super. at 47, 234 A.2d at 34.
107. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 65 Misc. 2d at 621, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 959. In Fidelity the trial
court's use of a proximate cause limitation was held to be error. Id.
108. Id.
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failure to examine references would contribute in a substantial
manner to the making of the forgery. "
2. Revised U.C.C. Section 3-406
Under the proposed revision to the Code, Stinn will likewise be
precluded from asserting the forged signature if Stinn's negligence
substantially contributed to the forgery.1 The proposed revisions
to the Code state that the "substantially contributes" test is
intended to be less rigorous than the "direct and proximate cause"
test."'1 The comments to the Code state that conduct will
substantially contribute to the loss if the conduct is a contributing
cause of the loss, and a substantial factor in bringing the forgery
about. 12 Accordingly, if Stinn's negligence is a contributing
cause of the signature and a substantial factor in bringing the
forgery about, then Stirn will be viewed as having substantially
contributed to the result."' There appears to be no requirement
that the conduct be the proximate cause of the loss. This will
increase the duty of the drawer to the drawee bank, and preclusion
should be established with greater ease." 4 Thus, the proposed
revisions to the Code appear to embrace those cases that have been
decided under the present Code interpreting "substantially
contributes" as shortening the chain of causation.
If an examination of Thief's references or background would
have brought out information which would have prevented the
forgery, then Stinn's negligence is a contributing cause of the
forgery. However, it is a question of fact whether the failure to
109. See, e.g., Chicago Heights Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Par Steel Products and Service Co.,
Inc., 123 M1. App. 3d 1054,463 N.E,2d 829,830-31 (1984) (employer owes no duty to drawee bank
to hire honest employees). But see Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. First Ala. Bank of North
America, 636 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981) (employer was negligent in failing to inquire into
employee's references); Read v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 286 S.C. 534,534 n.1, 335 S.E.2d 359,
359 n.1 (1985) (negligent failure to check background of employee responsible for corporate checking
accounts).
110. U.C.C. § R3-406(a).
111. Id. § 3-406 comment 2.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.
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examine references was a substantial factor in bringing about the
forgery.
3. Another Defense Under Current U.C.C. Section 4-406
Section 4-406 differs from section 3-406 by imposing a duty on
the customer after the forgery has taken place.'15 Stinn must use
reasonable care and promptness in examining its statement of
account. 116 Upon discovery of any alterations or unauthorized
drawer's signatures 17  Stinn must promptly notify BB, or
otherwise be precluded from asserting the existence of subsequent
unauthorized signatures or alterations by the same wrongdoer
against BB."' Stinn's failure to promptly discover and report an
altered or forged check renders Stinn liable for the bank's loss on
checks within Stin's statement." 9 However, a customer is less
likely to be familiar with the signature of an indorser, and
therefore, is not responsible under section 4-406(1) for discovering
or reporting a forged endorsement.'
Because Stinn is not responsible for reporting a forgery of
Creditor's endorsement, Stinn's claim cannot be precluded under
section 4-406(1). However, had Thief forged Stinn's signature, or
altered the check, then Stinn must act with reasonable care and
115. WHIrE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, at 694.
116. U.C.C. § 4-406(1).
117. Although ambiguous, "unauthorized signatures" should not be construed to include forged
endorsements. Rapson, Risk ofLoss Allocation: Under Articles 3 and 4 as Affected by the Proposed
Revisions Thereto, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY; THE EMERGING NEw UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
143, 156 (1990) (hereinafter Rapson).
118. U.C.C. § 4-406(1)-(2). The customer will be precluded from asserting an unauthorized
signature or alteration if the bank establishes that it suffered loss by reason of the customer's failure.
Id. § 4-406(2)(a). The customer will also be precluded from asserting subsequent forgeries or
alterations by the same wrongdoer after the statement was available to the drawer for a reasonable
time not exceeding fourteen calendar days. Id. § 4-406(2)(b).
119. U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(a). See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, at 695 (a customer's failure
to promptly discover and report forged checks renders customer liable for the bank's loss on checks
reported on the customer's statement of account, and also for any checks written by the same
wrongdoer).
120. U.C.C. § 4-406(1). Although there is little excuse for a customer failing to recognize the
customer's own signature, the customer does not know the signature of indorser, and may be delayed
in discovering the endorsements are forged. Id. § 4-406 comment 5.
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promptness in discovering the defect, or be precluded from
asserting the defect against BB. Section 4-406 also applies the law
of contributory negligence permitting Stinn's claim, regardless of
Stinn's own negligence, if BB failed to exercise ordinary care in
paying the check.'
Finally, section 4-406(4) provides a statute of limitations,
giving a customer an absolute time limit to assert their rights on
forged or altered instruments."n Regardless of Stinn's care, Stinn
will be precluded from asserting any impropriety against the bank
if Stinn fails to report an unauthorized endorsement within three
years from the time of the statement, or if Stinn fails to report an
unauthorized signature or alteration.'23 No cause of action based
on a forger's signature or alteration survives the application of
section 4-406(4), including causes of action for conversion, monies
had and received, and breach of contract. 24
4. Revised U.C.C. Section 4-406
The drawer's duty to examine a statement of account with
reasonable promptness is continued in the proposed revisions to the
Code.1' The bank must either return the items t26 paid, or
provide information sufficient to allow the customer to identify the
items. 27 The information is sufficient if it describes the item by
number, amount, and date of payment. 128 Upon receipt of
sufficient information or the items paid, the customer has a duty to
examine the statement or items and determine whether any item
121. Id. § 4-406(3).
122. Id. § 4-406 comment 5.
123. Id. § 4-406(4).
124. Brighton Inc. v. Colonial First Nat'l Bank v. Avenel Realty Co., 176 NJ. Super. 101,422
A.2d 433, 437-38 (1980) aff'd 86 NJ. 259, 430 A.2d 902 (1981). But see Sun N' Sand v. United
California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 699-700, 582 P.2d 920, 940, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 349 (1978)
(common law negligence action avoids the application of section 4-406).
125. U.C.C. § R4-406.
126. See id § R4-104(1)(h) (defining "item" as an instrument or promise to pay money
handled by a bank for collection or payment).
127. Id. § R4-406(a).
128. Id. § R4-406(a). See id. § R4-406 comment I (number, amount, and date of payment
chosen because such information can be obtained from the bank's computer).
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was unauthorized, altered, or contained a forged signature." 9 If
the customer should reasonably discover an unauthorized payment,
the customer has a duty to give prompt notification of any
impropriety to the bank.130 If the customer fails to comply with
these duties, the customer is precluded from later asserting the
customer's unauthorized signature, and if the bank suffered a loss
due to the customer's failure, the customer is precluded from later
asserting an alteration of the item.131 Moreover, if the customer
fails to notify the bank of the customer's unauthorized signature or
an alteration of the item within a reasonable time, 32 the customer
will be precluded from asserting subsequent improprieties by the
same wrongdoer. 133  Finally, alterations or forged customer
signatures must be reported within one year from the time of the
statement, or the customer will be precluded from recovery."3
Because the proposed revisions to section 4-406 deal only with
the customer's unauthorized signature or alterations of the
instrument, section R4-406 no longer covers forged
endorsements.135 Thus, the three year statute of limitations for
forged endorsements present in section 4-406 is no longer available
under the proposed revisions to section R4-406.136 However,
proposed section R4-111 imposes a three year statute of limitations
on all rights arising under Article 4.137 This statute of limitations
covers the customer's right to have its account recredited for
improperly paid items under revised section R4-401(1). 138 Thus,
129. Id. § R4-406(3).
130. Id.
131. Id. § R4-406(4)(a).
132. See iL § R4-406(4)(b) (reasonable period of time is presumed to be 14 calendar days after
the customer receives the statement of account).
133. Id. § R4-406(4).
134. Id. § R4-406(6).
135. The customer is only required to determine if a payment was unauthorized because of an
alteration, or because a purported signature by or on behalf of the customer was unauthorized. Id. §
4-406(3). See id. § 4-406 comment 5 (drawer has no duty to look for forged endorsements).
136. Rapson, supra note 117, at 156.
137. U.C.C. § R4-1 11. See U.C.C. § R4-406 comment 5 (stating that a customer has a three
year period to seek a recredit of the customer's account for an item bearing a forged endorsement
under section R4-111). Cf. U.C.C. § R3-118(g) (three year statute of limitations for rights arising
under article 3).
138. Rapson, supra note 117, at 157.
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the drawer, Stinn, must still assert a forged endorsement within
three years from the date on which the cause of action accrues.
This is the same result as would be provided for under the current
U.C.C. section 4-406.1
39
D. Stinn's Defenses to BB's Claim that Stinn is Precluded from
Recovery
1. Resolution Under the Present Code
Assuming Stinn is negligent, BB may claim that Stinn's action
for recredit of Stihm's account is precluded, unless Stinn can assert
that BB is contributorily negligent."4 Under the present Code,
only a drawee or other payor who in good faith paid the instrument
in accordance with reasonable commercial standards can assert the
section 3-406 preclusion against a drawer. 4 Accordingly, if the
bank fails to use ordinary care in paying the instrument, the bank
cannot assert the customer's failure to discover and report
unauthorized signatures under section 4-406 as a defense to the
customer's action for recredit of its account.14 Thus, BB's failure
to observe reasonable commercial standards permits Stinn's claim
against BB that the check with Creditor's forged endorsement was
not properly payable, regardless of Stinn's culpability.
43
139. U.C.C. § 4-406(4).
140. Sections 3-406 and 4-406 codify a form of contributory negligence. WHrrE & SUMMERS,
supra note 23, at 712. In the context of section 3-406 this has been referred to as a "double
preclusion. See Comment, The Double Preclusion of U.C.C. Section 3-406: Duties of Care and
Reasonable Commercial Standards, 32 DRAKE L. Rnv. 179 (1983) (discussing UCC section 3-406).
See generally, Comment, Check Forgeries: Variations of Rules of Liability Based on Fault-U.C.C.
Defense Sections 3-406 and 4-406, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 417, 424-25, 429-31 (1970) (discussing ban's
defenses under sections 4-406 and 3-406 respectively); Whaley, Negligence and Negotiable
Instruments, 53 N.C.L Rnv. 1 (1974) (discussing the effect of negligence on the validity of
negotiable instruments).
141. U.C.C. § 3-406. Reasonable commercial standards are those prevalent within the draweo's
business. Id.
142. Id. § 4-406(3).
143. Id.
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2. Resolution Under the Proposed Revisions to the Code
In comparison to the all or nothing liability imposed by the
present Code, the proposed revisions to sections 3-406 and 4-406
adopt a scheme of comparative negligence for negotiable
instruments.1" If the bank fails to exercise ordinary care in
paying the check,145 the loss is allocated between the parties
according to the extent their negligence contributed to the loss. 1
46
Under the hypothetical facts, Stinn would be able to recover from
BB only to the extent that Stinn's negligence did not contribute to
the forgery. In clear contrast to the present Code, there are no
circumstances where Stinn would be allowed full recovery, if
Stinn's negligence contributed to the forgery.' 4
7
E. A Possible Third Defense
Where the drawer is an employer, a third defense is available
within the Code. To analyze this defense it is necessary to alter the
facts of the hypothetical to indicate that Hajjar, Stinn's bookkeeper,
wrote a check to Thief, whose name had fraudulently been added
to the books as a creditor, with the intention of forging Thief's
endorsement after obtaining Stinn's signature. Hajjar obtains
Stinn's signature, forges Thief's endorsement, and cashes the check
at BB.
144. Id. §§ R3-406(b), R4-406(5).
145. Visual examination of the check is not required by a payor bank if the bank's procedure
is reasonably and commonly used by other comparable banks in the area. See id. § R4-406 comment
4 (rejecting prior split of authority between jurisdictions as to whether visual examination is
required).
146. Id. §§ R3-406(b), R4-406(5). However, if the bank fails to pay the item in good faith, the
preclusion provision of section R4-406(4) does not apply and the bank will be liable for all of the
loss. Id. § R4-406(5).
147. Compare id. §§ R3-406, R4-406 (adopting a system of comparative fault allocating loss
as a percentage of total fault) with Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City Bank, 28 Ohio St. 3d
221, 226, 503 N.E.2d 524, 530 (1986) rev'd in part 31 Ohio St. 3d 150, 509 N.E. 2d 945 (1987)
(party 85% at fault could potentially recover from party 15% at fault).
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1. Resolution Under the Present Code
Section 3-405 provides that an endorsement by any person in
the name of the payee is effective in three circumstances. 48 The
first is where an imposter induces the drawer to issue the
instrument to the imposter or a confederate.149 The second is
where a person who signs as, or on behalf of, the drawer intends
for the payee to have no interest in the instrument. 5 ' Finally, the
situation in which an agent or employee of the drawer supplies the
drawer with the name of the payee, intending the payee to have no
interest in the instrument.151 Fact patterns which arise under these
three situations are generally referred to as the imposter, fictitious
payee, and the padded payroll cases, respectively.'52
Unlike sections 3-406 and 4-406, the drawer is not precluded
from asserting that the item is not properly payable because of a
forged endorsement. Instead, when section 3-405(1) applies, the
endorsement is effective as though it were the endorsement of the
true owner.'53 Moreover, because the endorsement is effective, a
148. U.C.C. § 3-405(l). See May Department Stores Co. v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 374 F.2d
109, 110 (3rd Cir. 1967) (employee caused drawer to issue checks to fictitious payee, then forged
endorsement and cashed the checks); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. First City Bank, 675 S.W.2d 316,
317 (Tex. App. 1984) (employee submitted required check forms purportedly on behalf of a creditor,
and forged the endorsements); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 57
N.Y.2d 439,456 N.Y.S.2d 742,744,442 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (1982) (employee provided employer
with false creditor's names, intercepted checks, and forged the endorsements on the checks). While
a detailed examination of section 3-405 is beyond the scope of this Comment, a broader discussion
of this section can be found in Triantis, Allocation of Lossesfrom Forged Endorsements on Checks
and the Application of§ 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 669 (1986);
Note, U.C.C. Section 3-405: Of Impostors, Fictitious Payees, and Padded Payrolls, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1083 (1979); Comment, The Resolution of Padded Payroll Cases by the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Pandor's Box, 9 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 257 (1968); and Harbus, The Great
Pretender: A Look at the Impostor Provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 U. CIQ. L. REv.
385 (1978).
149. U.C.C. § 3-405(I)(a).
150. Id. § 3-405(1)(b).
151. This provision applies only to an agent or employee of the drawer who supplies the drawer
with the name of the payee. Id. § 3-405 comment 4. See Snug Harbor Realty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank
of Toms River, 105 NJ. Super. 572, 373,253 A.2d 581,582, (1969) aft'd54 NJ. 95, 253 A.2d 545
(1969) (section 3-405 is inapplicable where employee supplies employer with name of actual creditor
who had submitted invoices for work performed).
152. See Triantis, supra note 148, at 680.
153. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, at 699.
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subsequent holder is unable to assert a breach of the warranty of
good title154 and the warranty of presentment155 against a prior
holder in the stream of endorsements. 156 Thus, the check is valid,
must be paid, and the loss will be borne by the drawer.
157
Section 3-405 reflects the policy that the loss should fall on the
employer, because the employer is in the best position to prevent
the loss by the careful selection and supervision of employees.
158
The present Code does not require the bank to pay the instrument
with ordinary care, or with the observance of reasonable
commercial standards. 159  Because of the absence of these
requirements, section 3-406 has been referred to as a banker's
provision, and should be expanded with great reluctance.1"
Under section 3-405, the drawer will always bear the risk of
loss, even when the bank fails to exercise ordinary care. Therefore,
courts have attempted to limit the scope and impact of section
154. See U.C.C. § 4-207(a)(1) (warranty of good title).
155. See i& § 3-417(1) (warranty of presentment).
156. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 149 Cal. App. 3d 60, 71, 196 Cal. Rptr 614, 621
(1983) (plaintiff's breach of warranty action was defective where plaintiff failed to plead facts
negating padded payroll, exclusion which made the forged endorsement effective); Brighton Inc. v.
Colonial First Nat'l Bank v. Avenel Realty Co., 176 NJ. Super. 101,422 A.2d 433,439 (1980) aff'd
86 NJ. 259,430 A.2d 902 (1981) (because the endorsement is effective, a collecting bank's liability
under the section 4-207 warranty is precluded); Sun 'N Sand v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d
671, 687, 582 P. 2d 920, 931, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 (1978) (because the endorsement is effective
no warranty has been breached). See Triantis, supra note 148, at 681 (the effective endorsement
preserves the chain of title and satisfies the Code's warranties of title under sections 3-417 and 4-
207).
157. Brighton Inc. v. Colonial First Nat'l Bank v. Avenel Realty Co., 176 NJ. Super. 101,422
A.2d 433, 439 (1980) aff'd 86 NJ. 259,430 A.2d 902(1981) (because the endorsement is effective
a collecting bank's liability under the section 4-207 warranty is precluded).
158. U.C.C. § 3-405 comment 4. The loss is a risk of the employer's business enterprise, and
the cost of fidelity insurance is an expense of the employer's business. Id. Arguably, the employer
is also in the best position to guard against the loss from impostors by identifying the proper party
to whom to issue the check. Triantis, supra note 148, at 680. Also, the employer is in the best
position to prevent fictitious payees by exercising care in granting the authority to issue checks on
the employer's behalf. Id.
159. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 57 N.Y.2d 439,442 N.E.2d
1253, 1257, 456 N.Y.S.2d 742, 746-47 (1982).
160. WHrnE & SuimmES, supra note 23, at 710 (a banker's provision written "by them and
for them").
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3-405.161 To avoid this apparent inequity, a few jurisdictions
require strict compliance with the language of the Code, requiring
a precise match between the endorsed name and the name of the
payee. 62 Although section 3-405 does require the endorsement
to be in the name of the payee,'63 compliance with the spirit of
the Code should require only a "substantial similarity" between
the endorsed name and the name of the payee."6 This is because
the Codes definition of a signature is purposefully broad to include
any symbol executed with the present intention of authenticating a
writing." Moreover, under the Code, a signature consists of the
use of any name on an instrument, or the use of any word or mark
in lieu of a written signature.'6 To be so liberal in defining a
signature and so restrictive by requiring an exact match appears
inconsistent.
There are other techniques courts utilize to limit the effect of
section 3-405. One is to expand the duty of good faith that section
1-203 of the Code imposes on all transactions governed by the
Code.' 67 Consistent with this duty most courts require the bank
to have acted in good faith before the bank may assert that the
161. Triantis, supra note 148, at 680. See WHIm & SUMMERS, supra note 23, at 707 (arguing
that where both parties have been negligent the bank should bear the loss, as with sections 3-406 and
4-406).
162. See Consolidated Public Water Supply District No. C-I v. Farmers Bank, 686 S.W.2d 844,
850 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83,92-93 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976)) (a forged endorsement must be exactly the same as the named payee for the section 3-405
preclusion provision to apply); First Nat'l Bank of Neenah v. Security Nat'l Bank of Springfield, 32
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 926, 934 (Mass. Dist. CL 1981) (imposter defense of section 3-405 is not
applicable where the endorsement is in a name slightly different than that of the named payee);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 22 Wash. App. 46, 587 P.2d 617, 623 (1978)
(requiring endorsement to be in the exact name of the payee to be effective under section 3405). See
also Triantis, supra note 148, at 682 (courts may require an exact match to limit the impact of section
3-405).
163. U.C.C. § 3-405(1).
164. See Kraftsman Container Corp. v. United Counties Tr., 169 NJ. Super. 488, 404 A.2d
1288, 1291 (1979) (endorsement must be "substantially identical" to the name of the named payee);
Western Casualty & Surety v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces, 676 F.2d 1344, 1346 (10th Cir. 1982)
(difference in spelling in no way affects the purposes of section 3-405, which are to ensure: (1) The
normal appearance of the check; and (2) the person negotiating the check can be identified as the
named payee).
165. U.C.C. § 1-201(39).
166. Id. § 3-401(2).
167. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (duty of good faith).
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endorsement is effective against the drawer.168 The Code and a
majority of jurisdictions define good faith as honesty in fact.' 69
However, other jurisdictions have broadened bad faith to include
gross negligence or willful ignorance, so that the bank's culpability
is a factor in determining whether the bank will bear the loss.17
Another technique employed by a few jurisdictions, including
California, is to limit the application of section 3-405 by utilizing
common law actions.171 This enables these jurisdictions to hold
that it is irrelevant whether the endorsement is effective because
the bank's negligence was a breach of a duty to the drawer
independent of the Code. 172 Still other jurisdictions do not permit
a bank that cashes a check to assert the section 3-405 defense that
168. Triantis, supra note 148 at 683. See Kraftsman Container Corp. V. United Counties Trust
Co., 169 NJ. Super 488, 404 A.2d 1288, 1291 (1979) (although simple negligence does not bar a
bank from invoking section 3-405 as a defense, bad faith wili bar the bank's claim). Bad faith may
be evidenced by a consistent failure by the bank to monitor and investigate a series of irregular
transactions. Id. 404 A.2d at 1293. Cf. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Citibank, 73 N.Y.2d 263,
536 N.E.2d 1118, 1124-25, 539 N.Y.S 2d 699, 705-06 (1989) (a bank cannot use section 3-405 to
shield its own dishonesty, because such conduct false outside the allocation of risk encompassed by
section 3-405); Consolidated Public Water Supply Dist. No. C-1 v. Farmers Bank, 686 S.W.2d 844,
853 (Mo. App. 1985) (section 3-405 does not permit recovery against a bank that pays an instrument
in good faith).
169. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (definition of good faith as honesty in fact). See also Western
Casualty & Surety v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces, 676 F.2d 1344, 1346 (10th Cir. 1982) (good faith
requirement of section 3-405 is honesty in fact). Cf. Bd. of Higher Educ. of the City of New York
v. Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560,383 N.Y.S.2d 508,511 (1976) (bad faith conduct will permit
a drawer to recover).
170. Triantis, supra note 148, at 683. See Bd. of Higher Educ. of the City of New York v.
Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (1976) (trier of fact could find that
defendant's conduct amounted to gross negligence or bad faith which would permit plaintiff's
recovery). Cf. Kraftsman Container Corp. v. United Counties Trust Co., 169 NJ. Super. 488, 404
A.2d 1288, 1293 (1979) (bad faith may be evidenced by a consistent failure to monitor and
investigate a series of irregular transactions).
171. Triantis, supra note 148, at 685. See International Industries, Inc. v. Island State Bank, 348
F. Supp. 886, 888 (S.D. Texas 1971) (drawer permitted to sue a collecting bank under a theory of
money had and received); Sun N' Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 696, 582
P.2d 920, 937, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 346 (1978) (section 3-405 does not preclude a common law
negligence action). But see Western Casualty & Surety v. Citizens Bank, 676 F.2d 1344, 1347 (10th
Cir. 1982) (section 3-405 displaces a common law negligence action); Consolidated Public Water
Supply Dist. C-1 v. Farmers Bank, 686 S.W.2d 844,853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (section 3-405 permits
no common law negligence action); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. First Nat'1 Bank, 675 S.W.2d 316,
319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (because the endorsement is effective, the final payment rule of section
3-418 precludes liability for negligence, conversion, and monies had and received).
172. Sun N' Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 696, 582 P.2d 920, 937,
148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 346 (1978).
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the endorsement is effective.'73 These jurisdictions refuse these
banks the right to assert a section 3-405 defense by considering the
bank which cashes a check to be a purchaser of the check and not
a collecting bank as required under section 3-405.174
Returning to the facts in this variation of the hypothetical,
Hajjar supplied Stinn with Thief's name, not intending for Thief to
have an interest in the instrument. This falls within the padded
payroll rule of 3-405(1)(c), and Haijar's forgery of Thief's
endorsement is effective. 175 Because the endorsement is effective,
the check becomes properly payable and when BB pays the item,
it does so properly. The Code allocates the loss to Stinn, regardless
of his culpability, and anticipates that Stinn will absorb the loss as
a cost of Stinn's business. 7 6
2. Proposed Revisions to U.C.C. Section 3-404 and 3-405
The proposed revisions to the Code separate the work done by
present section 3-405 into two sections, R3-404 and R3-405.
Section R3-404 covers only those situations where a person does
not intend17 7 for the payee to have an interest in the instrument,
or where the payee is a fictitious person.17 1 In either of those
situations, the proposed revisions to the Code provide that any
person in possession of the instrument is the holder of the
instrument, and an endorsement in the name of the payee is
effective in favor of any person who in good faith pays the
instrument or accepts the instrument for value. 179 These are the
173. Rapson, supra note 117, at 154. Compare Bd. of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511, (1976) (bank that cashes check is a
.. purchaser" and is not entitled to the defenses available to a collecting bank) with Brighton, Inc. v.
Colonial First Nat'l Bank, 176 NJ. Super 101, 422 A.2d 433, 441 (App. Div. 1980) aff'd 86 N.J.
259, 430 A.2d 902 (1981) (bank which cashes checks is a collecting bank).
174. Bd of Higher Educ., 383 N.Y.S.2d at 511 (bank that cashes check is a "'purchaser," not
a collecting bank).
175. U.C.C. § 3-405.
176. See U.C.C. § 3-405 comment 4(b).
177. See U.C.C. § R3-110(a) (defining person whose intent determines to whom an instruments
is payable).
178. Id. § R3-404(b).
179. Id. §§ R3-404(b)(1)-(2).
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same consequences as would be achieved in these situations under
the present Code.
Rejecting those cases which limited the impact of current
section 3-405 by not permitting a bank which cashed a check to
assert the present section 3-405 defenses,18 ° the proposed
revisions to the Code now expressly permit a bank which cashes a
check to raise section R3-404 as a defense.18' Section R3-
404(b)(2) accomplishes this by providing that any person who takes
the instrument for value may assert that the endorsement is
effective. 18 2 Since a bank that cashes a check takes the instrument
for value, that bank may assert that the endorsement is effective.
Also, section R3-404 rejects those cases which require the
endorsement to be in the exact name of the named payee.'83
Rather, the proposed revisions to the Code adopt the position that
the endorsement must be only substantially similar to the name of
the payee for the endorsement to be effective.'" Although this
will decrease a drawer's chances of recovery, it is in compliance
with the spirit of the Code, which requires that the Code be
liberally construed and applied to promote a policy of
simplification. 1
5
Although proposed section R3-405 governs those cases covered
by the existing padded payroll provision, section 3-405(1)(c),
proposed section R3-405 is broader, covering situations where an
entrusted employee forges the employer's signature on an
endorsement.' 86 If an employee did not intend to misappropriate
the instrument until after the instrument was drawn, then proposed
section R3-405 controls. 87 Where an employee has been
180. See supra notes 148-176 and accompanying text (discussing section 3-405 limitations).
181. U.C.C. § R3-404(b).
182. Id. § R3-404(b)(2).
183. See, e.g., Consolidated Public Water Supply District No. C-1 v. Farmers Bank, 686
S.W.2d 844, 850 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (forged endorsement must be exactly the same as that of the
named payee). See also supra note 162 and accompanying text (cases holding endorsed name must
be in the exact name of the payee).
184. U.C.C. § R3-404(c). See id. § R3-404 comment I (noting that section 3-404(c) only
requires that the endorsement be substantially similar to that of the named payee).
185. U.C.C. § 1-201(1)-(2).
186. Id § R3-405.
187. U.C.C. § R3-404 comment 2, case 2.
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entrusted with responsibility for instruments, section R3-405 makes
the employee's fraudulent endorsements effective for a person who
in good faith pays an instrument or accepts the instrument for
value.'88 Section R3-405 reflects the belief that the employer is
in a much better position to avoid the loss through the careful
selection and supervision of employees." 9
Despite the above limitations, section R3-405 is favorable to an
employer in at least one respect."9 Under the present Code, the
bank is entitled to assert the section 3-405 defense regardless of the
bank's culpability, so long as the bank accepted the check in good
faith. 9' However, under the proposed revisions to the Code, part
of the loss may be recovered by the employer from the bank, to the
extent the bank's failure to exercise ordinary care contributed to the
loss."9 This recovery by the drawer is now permitted under both
section R3-404 and R3-405.' 93 Specifically, the statute provides
that if the person who pays the instrument fails to exercise ordinary
care, the person bearing the loss may recover from that person to
the extent the failure to use ordinary care contributed to the
loss.'94 In this way the drawer may recover from the bank the
amount of the loss that the bank caused by its negligence. The
effect is to limit some of the harsh result under the present section
3-405.
Returning to the hypothetical, as a bookkeeper who has the
authority to prepare a check payable to a fictitious creditor, Hajjar
has the authority to prepare instruments for the employer's
signature. This authority defines Hajjar as an employee entrusted
with responsibility, 95  and under section R3-405 Hajjar's
fraudulent endorsement is effective.' 9' In the absence of
188. Id. § R3-405(a)-(b).
189. Id. § R3-405 comment 1.
190. Cf. id. § R3-405 comment 2 (section R3-405 is more favorable then present Code section
3-405 by permitting the drawer to assert the bank's negligence).
191. Id. § R3-405 comment 2 (explaining differences with present Code).
192. Id. §§ R3-405(b), R3-404(d). This failure must substantially contribute to the loss. Id.
193. See id. §§ R3-404, R3-405.
194. Id. §§ R3-405(b), R3-404(d).
195. See id. § 3-405(a)(3) (definition of responsibility).
196. Id. § 3-405(b).
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negligence by BB, Stinn will be unable to have its account
recredited because the item was properly payable. 197 If, however,
BB was negligent, then Stinn will recover to the extent BB's
negligence contributed to the loss.'
F. Whether Stinn May Assert a Claim Directly Against LB
Before the Code was adopted, the law was unclear on whether
the drawer had a direct cause of action against a collecting bank or
against another person who took a check with a forged
endorsement and received payment.199 This uncertainty has
continued under the Code, producing mixed and uncertain case
law."° The Code does not expressly provide for such an action.
It can be argued that the absence of such a provision indicates an
intention to not permit such an action.20 ' Other jurisdictions,
encouraged by the policy of preventing circuity of suits' 2 permit
a direct suit against the collecting bank, manipulating the language
of the Code to fit their needs.20 3 Within the jurisdictions
permitting suit, several potential causes of action are permitted,
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. BAl.EY, supra, note 25, at 26-44, See generally Annotation, Rights and Remedy of Drawer
of Check Against Collecting Bank Which Receives it on Forged Indorsement and Collects it From
Drawee Bank, 99 A.LR. 2D 637 (1965).
200. BAu.EY, supra note 25, at 26-26. Compare infra notes 207-217 and accompanying text
(drawer permitted to recover against depositary/collecting bank) with infra notes 218-220 and
accompanying text (drawer not permitted to recover against depositary/collecting bank).
201. BAILEY, supra note 25, at 26-26.
202. The court in Cooper v. Union Bank stated, "Requiring cumbersome and uneconomical
circuity of action to achieve an identical result would obviously run contra the code's explicit
underlying purpose *to [simplify], clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions."' Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal 3d 371, 381-82, 507 P.2d 609, 617, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1,
9 (quoting U.C.C. section 1-102(2)(a)).
203. See, e.g., Sun N' Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 682-83, 582 P. 2d
920,928,148 Cal. Rptr. 329,3337 (1978) (drawer of check is payor of check and may assert a claim
for breach of warranty against a collecting bank).
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including causes of action for breach of warranty, t 4
negligence,205 and conversion.2t 6
1. Can Stinn Assert a Breach of Warranty Against LB?
a. Resolution Under the Current Code
i. Warranties
There is a clear split of authority among jurisdictions on
whether the warranty of good title provided for in section 4-
207(1)(a) and the warranty of presentment provided by section 3-
417(1) run to the drawer.2 7 The warranty of presentment present
in section 4-207(1) is available only to a payor bank or any other
payor who pays or accepts the item.208 Several jurisdictions,
including California, have held that the drawer is an "other
payor," so that the warranty of title runs directly to the
drawer.2' These courts hold that because the drawer's account is
debited for the amount of the check, the drawer is the party that
ulthnately pays and, thus, is a payor entitled to assert the warranty
of good title.210 Support for this conclusion arises from the
argument that because section 4-207 (b)(ii) and (c)(ii) expressly
exempt the drawer from the warranties of a holder in due course,
the drawer should be given the warranty of good title by negative
204. See supra notes 207-217 and accompanying text (discussing cause of action for breach
of warranty).
205. See supra notes 221-222 and accompanying text (discussing cause of action for common
law negligence).
206. See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text (discussing cause of action for
conversion).
207. Compare Sun N' Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671,682-83,582 P.2d
920, 928, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 337 (1978) (drawer of check is payor of check and may assert an
action for breach of warranty against a collecting bank) with Brighton, Inc. v. Colonial First Nat'l
Bank, 176 NJ. Super. 101,422 A.2d 433,442 (1980) (generally a drawer's claim against a collecting
bank is unavailable).
208. U.C.C. § 4-207(1).
209. Sun 'N Sand, 21 Cal. 3d at 682, 582 P.2d at 928, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 337; Insurance Co.
of North America v. Atlas Supply Co., 172 S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ga. App. 1970) (drawer whose account
is debited is a payor entitled to assert the section 4-207 warranties).
210. Insurance Co. of North America, 172 S.E. 2d at 636.
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implication.211 For these reasons, and because the drawer is a
person who pays in good faith, these cases state that the warranty
of presentment under section 3-417(1) also runs to the drawer.212
It has also been suggested by other courts that the drawer is a
third party beneficiary of a collection warranty under common law
contract principles.213 Several jurisdictions have permitted this
cause of action for breach of warranty, finding that the drawer is
the legal assignee of the drawee's warranty claims under sections
4-207(1)(a) and 3-417(1).214 Other jurisdictions which have
permitted recovery include Illinois, 215  Indiana, 21 6  and
Wisconsin.217
Other jurisdictions do not permit the drawer to directly sue the
depositary bank.218  These courts recognize that the drawer's
remedy against the drawee bank for recredit of the drawer's
account is sufficient.21 9 Moreover, these cases conclude that the
drawer is not an "other payor," and that the warranties of title
made by the depositary bank do not run to the drawer.2" These
211. Sun N' Sand, 21 Cal. 3d at 682, 582 P.2d at 928, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
212. Id.
213. Allied Concord Fin. Corp. v. Bank of America, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3-4, 80 Cal. Rptr.
622, 624 (1969) (the benefit of warranties by a bank which negotiates a check extends to drawer).
214. International Indus., Inc. v. Island State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886, 888 (S.D. Tex. 1971)
(assignment of drawee's breach of warranty to drawer); Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Central Penn. v.
Commonwealth, 9 Pa. Commw. 358, 305 A.2d 769, 770 (1973) (assignment of rights from drawee
bank to drawer).
215. Justus Co., Inc. v. Gary Wheaton Bank, 509 F. Supp. 103, 106 (N.D. 111. 1981) (assignee
of drawers claim permitted to sue depositary bank under Illinois law).
216. Insurance Co. of North America v. Purdue Nat'l Bank of Lafayette, 401 N.E.2d 708,714
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (drawer is an -other payor" who may claim the benefit of the warranties
created by the Code).
217. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha, 98 Wis. 2d 474,297
N.W..2d 46, 49 (1980) (indicating that a direct action may lie, although bank not liable because of
drawer's negligence); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 315 F. Supp. 520,522 (E.D.
Wis. 1970) (permitting a direct suit by the drawer against a depositary bank under Wisconsin law).
218. See Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184
N.E.2d 358, 363 (1962) (drawer not permitted to directly sue a collecting bank); Brighton Inc. v.
Colonial First Nat'l Bank, 176 NJ. Super. 101, 422 A.2d 433, 442-43 (1980) (only claim drawer
could assert against collecting bank was a clair'sounding in fraud, which fell outside the scope of
the Code); Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Snyder, 141 NJ. Super 539, 358 A.2d 859, 862 (1976)
(drawer not permitted to sue collecting bank on a theory of warranty).
219. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d
358, 363 (1962),
220. Brighton Inc. v. Colonial First Nat'! Bank, 176 NJ. Super 101,422 A.2d 433,442 (1980).
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jurisdictions recognize that the drawer is not a payor merely
because the drawer's account is debited. In the author's opinion,
this should represent the preferred view, because this view probably
more closely tracks the meaning and intent of the Code.
iL Other Causes of Action
There is also a judicial split on whether Stinn will be able to
assert an affirmative claim of negligence or conversion against
LB. 1  Although a few courts permit a cause of action for
common law negligence, ' generally a negligence cause of action
is denied.22
In addition, an action for conversion of a forged endorsement
may also be available. The Code explicitly permits an action for
conversion on a forged endorsement.' a To the extent that an
action for conversion under the Code is not available to a plaintiff,
a common law action for conversion may be available. '
However, for an action in conversion to exist, the drawer must
have a property interest in the check. Many courts maintain that the
221. Compare Stone & Webster, 184 N.E.2d at 363 (drawer is not permitted to sue a collecting
bank using a negligence cause of action) with Sun N" Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal.
3d 671, 696, 582 P.2d 920, 937, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 346 (1978) (permitting a common law
negligence action).
222. See, e.g., Sun N' Sand, 21 Cal. 3d at 696, 582 P.2d at 937, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 346. See
generally Triantis, supra note 148, at 677 (failure to verify the identity of holder of check or validity
of endorsement has been held to be actionable on grounds of negligence).
223. See Western Casuglty & Surety v. Citizens Bank, 676 F.2d 1344, 1347 (10th Cir. 1982)
(section 3-405 displaces a common law negligence action); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 675 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (because the endorsement is effective, the final
payment rule of section 3-418 precludes liability for negligence, conversion, and monies had and
received); Consolidated Public Water Supply Dist. C-I v. Farmers Bank, 686 S.W.2d 844, 853 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985) (section 3-405 permits no common law negligence action). See also WHrTE &
SUMMERs, supra note 23, at 711 (arguing that courts should be hesitant to adopt affirmative claims
of negligence).
224. U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c). Clearly, where the right to the check has passed to the payee, the
payee has a cause of action for conversion. See Annotation, Payee's Right of Recovery in Conversion
Under U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c), for Money Paid on Unauthorized Indorsement, 23 A.L.R. 4TH 855
(1983).
225. Triantis, supra note 148, at 673.
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rights of ownership belong not to the drawer but to the intended
payee only, thus precluding an action for conversion. 6
b. Resolution Under the Revised Code
i. Warranties
The proposed revisions to the Code do not give the drawer the
benefit of the warranties provided by the Code. The presentment
warranties found in sections R3-417227 and R4-208228 provide
that only the drawee has the right to recover damages based on
these warranties. 9 By deleting the words "other payor" found
in present section 4-207(1)(a) from the current presentment
warranties, the drafters of the revised Code reject those cases which
held that the drawer can be held to be an other payor.230 The
result in these cases is expressly rejected by comment 2 to section
R3-417.23' Additionally, comment 2 to section 3-417 states that
no warranty is made to the drawer when presentment is made to
the drawee under section 3-417(a). 2  The apparent procedure
mandated by the proposed Code is that the drawer must sue the
226. See Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184
N.E.2d 358,362 (Mass. 1962) (check would be valuable property in the hands of the payee); Central
Cadillac, Inc. v. Stem Haskell, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1280, 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (drawer has no action
against collecting bank for conversion of checks bearing forged endorsements); Life Ins. Co. of
Virginia v. Snyder, 141 NJ. Super. 359, 358 A.2d 859, 862 (NJ. Dist. CL 1976) (because drawer
did not have the right to possession of check the elements of conversion were lacking).
227. The presentment warranty under section R3-417 provides that a person obtaining payment
or acceptance of a draft, at the time of presentment, and previous transferrers of the draft, at the time
of transfer, warrant to drawee who pays or accepts the draft in good faith that: (1) They are, or were,
persons entitled to enforce the draft at the time they transferred the draft; (2) that the draft has not
been altered; and (3) that the warrantor has no knowledge that the drawer's signature is unauthorized.
U.C.C. § R3-417(a). See id. § R3-104(f) (definition of draft).
228. The presentment warranties provided for under the proposed revision to section R4-208
conform to those given by section R3-417. However, the term "draft" is defined by section R4-
104(l)(g) to include those items, other than instruments, which are orders. Id. § R4-208 comment.
See id. § R4-104(1)(g) (definition of draft).
229. Id. § R3-417(a).
230. U.C.C. §§ R3-417(a), R4-208(1). See Sun N' Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal.
3d 671, 682-83, 582 P.2d 920, 928, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 337 (1978) (drawer of check is payor of
check and may assert an actin for breach of warranty against a collecting bank).
231. U.C.C. § R3-417 comment 2.
232. Id. § R3-417 comment 2.
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drawee bank for recredit of the drawer's account.233 The drawee
bank can then recover from the depositary/collecting bank under
the presentment warranties." Thus, under the proposed revisions,
Stinn will be unable to assert a claim against LB for breach of
warranty.
ii. Other Causes of Action
Although a conversion action still exists in the proposed
revisions to the Code, the drawer is unable to bring such an
action."' The drawer's right to have its account recredited under
section R4-401(1) is considered an adequate remedy.236 Arguably,
because the drawer's remedy is adequate, no negligence action
should be allowed under the proposed revisions to the Code.
However, there is no clear impediment for a court to permit an
affirmative claim based on negligence, which may continue to be
viewed as proper under certain circumstances.237
Because the apparent procedure mandated by the proposed
revisions to the Code is for the drawer to sue the drawee bank,
Stinn will have no claim against LB on Stinn's warranties of
presentment.238 Moreover, the drawer's remedy for recredit of the
drawer's account is stated to be adequate. 3 In sum, absent
causes of action falling outside the Code, Stinn will be unable to
assert any claim against LB.
233. Id. § R4-401(1).
234. Rapson, supra note 117 at 147.
235. U.C.C. § R3-420(a), Code section R3-420 provides that a drawer, a maker, or an acceptor
of an instrument may not assert an action for conversion. Id.
236. Id. § R3-420 comment 1.
237. Cf. Wmrri & SuMMERS, supra note 23, at 712 (common law negligence action may be
proper in certain circumstances).
238. U.C.C. § R4-401(1).
239. Id. § R3-420 comment 1.
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V. CONCLUSION
The proposed revisions to the Code dealing with the allocation
of the risk of loss may be placed into two broad categories. The
first category consists of those changes which are attempts to
clarify and correct those provisions of existing law that have
caused interpretive difficulties for the courts.240  These
modifications can be characterized as changes motivated by a
desire for interjurisdictional uniformity. In the area of negotiable
instruments uniformity will breed certainty, allowing a bank to
adopt cost-effective policies which its employees can follow.241
This area is one in which it may be more important to have the law
settled, rather than having it settled right.242 Any movement
towards uniformity is to be applauded.
However, this attempt to encourage uniformity will continue to
be frustrated by the refusal of the Code's drafters to expressly deal
with the availability of remedies outside the ambit of the Code.
2 43
It appears that at one time a blanket prohibition on such suits was
considered, and then rejected because of potentially wide ranging
and unpredictable effects.24 The proposed revisions to the Code
suggest that the drawer's account under section 4-401 is sufficient,
implying that actions outside the Code are prohibited.245
However, this suggestion may be limited to denying the drawer an
action in conversion because of its placement within the conversion
section, and should not affect the availability of a common law
negligence action. Moreover, the refusal to adopt an explicit
prohibition against actions outside the Code may be seen as
condoning suits within those jurisdictions that currently allow
240. Rubin, supra note 56, at 628.
241. Hull, Common Law Negligence and Check Fraud Loss Allocation: Has Common Law
Supplemented or Supplanted the U.C.C., 51 OHIo ST. LJ. 605, 612.
242. Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)) ("[It is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.").
243. See supra notes 233-239 and accompanying text (discussing whether causes of action such
as negligence are available to a drawer under the proposed revisions to the Code).
244. Rubin, supra note 56, at 653.
245. U.C.C. § R3-420 comment 2.
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common law actions. These suits include actions claiming
negligence. Also, commentators have suggested that because of
uncertainties in the drafting and intent of the proposed Code,
common law principles are necessary to fill the gaps left by the
drafters.246 However, by failing to deal with this issue, the
proposed Code will cause needless confusion, costs, and
litigation.24
7
The second category, the allocation of the risk of loss through
the adoption of comparative fault, may be considered equitable in
nature. An allocation of loss according to fault comports with an
intuitive sense of justice, and will eliminate the seemingly
inequitable result of cases like Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National
City Bank.24 In a change favoring the drawer, the adoption of
comparative fault in sections R3-404, and R3-405 is especially
significant because of its recognition of a bank's culpability in
allocating fault.249 These changes will create a more equitable
result which will further a goal of uniformity, because courts will
not feel the need to look beyond the Code for just solutions.
It can also be argued that any movement away from all or
nothing liability will promote settlements. Each side will want to
avoid costly litigation, and may be willing to settle the claim rather'
than leave a disputed amount up to the impulses of a jury. Also,
each party may recognize partial responsibility for the loss, and a
compromise position may be easier to reach than one where the
liability is all or nothing. However, because comparative negligence
may invite arbitrary and inconsistent jury findings, a rule which
mandates a sure outcome may have been better for this area of the
law to increase the certainty of a particular outcome. Any
uncertainty in the outcome of litigation may have significant
ramifications for the policies that a bank may adopt. Under the
present version of the Code, a bank that was negligent was
246. Hull, supra note 241, at 642.
247. id.
248. 28 Ohio St. 3d 221,221,503 N.E.2d 523,526 (1986) (holding a party 85% at fault could
potentially recover the full amount of liability from a part 15% at fault).
249. See supra notes 190-194 and accompanying text (contrasting proposed sections 113-404
and R3-405 with present section 3-405).
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responsible for the full amount of the forged check. Under the
proposed revisions such a bank will be liable only to the extent that
its negligence contributed to the loss. Thus, it may become cost-
effective for a bank to relax its preventative policies and absorb the
cost of suits as a cost of doing business. Finally, comparative
negligence also invites factual hearings involving substantial
expense, which may disable some drawers from pursuing a
recoveryz
0
Proposed Articles 3 and 4 continue to remain bankers'
provisions. The adoption of the comparative negligence principles,
while equitably justifiable, may exact an economically excessive
price on both litigants and the banking industry. The movement
towards uniformity, while admirable, falls short of the certainty
required in this area.
James Stuart Bailey
250. Rubin, supra'note 56, at 650.
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